Abstract
Introduction
Sensor network is an emerging technology that plays a key role in sensing, gathering and propagating information about environmental phenomena. It consists of large number of small tiny sized sensor nodes, which are densely deployed in the environment [1] . The primary mission of sensor network is to detect and report events occurring with in the range of sensor network. Events can be any thing like movements of troops, movements of armed vehicles, detection of chemical occurrences etc. Once an event is detected, detecting sensor node may report the event directly to the remote command and control application or collaborate with other sensors in the network to more reliably identify and track a target. Sensor networks can be used for various application areas (e.g. health, military, home, etc). For different application areas there are different technical issues where researchers are currently working on.
Sensor Networks are based on wireless networks therefore they are more vulnerable from a security perspective as compared to wired networks. Much work has been done so far for providing security in a wireless networks, but unfortunately we can not use those solutions in wireless sensor networks because it has different characteristics. The basic difference between ad hoc wireless networks and sensor networks are [2] • Sensor network's topology changes very frequently.
• Sensor nodes communicate with each other in a broadcast manner, whereas most nodes in ad hoc networks communicate with each other in a point-to-point manner.
• Power, computational capacities and memory are limited in sensor nodes.
• In a typical sensor network the numbers of nodes are much more than ad hoc networks.
• Due to large number of sensor nodes that are densely deployed in a sensor network may not have global identification (ID). With the emergence of ubiquitous computing the role of sensor network is becoming more important and the need of security in ubiquitous sensor network environment is critical. There are two major constraints with wireless sensor networks which are making harder to implement traditional security mechanisms.
1. Limited Memory and Storage Space: Commonly sensor nodes have 8-bit, 4 MHz CPU with only 8K (total) of memory and disk space. 2. Power Limitation: Another major constraint with wireless sensor is that of limited power. Before going to implement security functionalities (e.g. encryption, decryption, verifying data, signatures, key exchanges, etc), we need to take care of how much power would be consumed. The objective of this work is to investigate the current state of the art security solutions that are specially developed for wireless sensor networks and find out their pros and cons. From investigation we found that none of the solutions provide complete security to the wireless sensor networks and most of them are providing security based on the assumption that the environment is trusted [3] . Therefore we proposed a hypothetical framework called "Tetra security Framework" for the wireless sensor networks. The objective of Tetra security framework is to focus on solving many open questions [4] which are
• How much and what type of security is really needed? • How can misbehave nodes be prevented from providing false data? • How can we create the dynamic trust relationship among sensor nodes? • Can energy and security be traded-off such that the level of network security can be easily adapted? The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discuses the security threads to distributed wireless sensor networks. Section 3 describes the basic security requirements. In section 4 we have given the comparison of existing security protocols. Section 5 describes proposed Tetra security frame for distributed wireless sensor networks and last section contains conclusion.
Security Threads
There are number of different threats to the sensor networks like DoS, eavesdropping, message injection, message replay, message modification, malicious code, and side channel analysis, etc. The security primitives against these attacks are message confidentiality, authentication, service availability, message freshness, message integrity, non-repudiation, intrusion detection, and audit trials etc.
In a wireless sensor network it is much easier to monitor transmission between nodes as compared to wired networks because of the broadcast nature of transmission. Encrypting communication between sensor nodes can partly solve this problem but it requires robust key exchange and distribution scheme, compelling the wireless sensor networks to maintain secrecy in the rest of the network when an adversary compromises few sensor nodes and exposes their secret keys.
In Sensor networks end-to-end encryption is impractical because of large number of communicating nodes and each node is incapable of storing large number of encryption keys. Therefore hop-by-hop encryption mechanism is usually used in which each sensor node stores only encryption keys shared with its immediate neighbors [5] .
A DOS attack is an event that causes weaken or reduces the network's capacity to carry out its expected function. Protocols or design level vulnerabilities are the main cause of DOS attacks. Normally DOS attacks in wireless networks can occur at the physical layer, for example, via radio jamming. Through malicious transmission they can interfere with sensor network protocols or physically destroy central network nodes. "Attackers can induce battery exhaustion in sensor nodes" [6] for example, they can engage certain specific nodes in processing and forwarding maliciously sent packets, thereby exhausting their energy resource. More dangerous attacks can occur from inside the sensor network if the attackers can compromise the sensor nodes. For example, they could create routing loops that will sooner or later tire out all nodes in the loop. For DOS attack resistance, attempts have been made on cryptographic authentication mechanisms, but because of the limited resources available to a sensor node make digital signature schemes impractical. General DOS attacks are listed in table 1. Wireless Sensor networks are susceptible to many types of intrusion such as black hole, flooding, misdirection, tempering etc. In wired networks traffic is analyzed at various concentration points for detecting intrusion that requires high memory and consumes lot of energy. Therefore wireless sensor networks require a solution that is fully distributed and inexpensive in terms of memory, communications and energy requirements [7] .
Security Requirements
Basic security services which are generally required, are mentioned below
• Authentication: this service is used to ensure that the message originated from authenticated sources, and both communicating entities are legitimate.
• Access Control: this service is used to ensure that only authorized entities can access required resources.
• Non-repudiation: this service prevents the sender or receiver from denying the sent or received message.
• Data integrity: This service ensures that the message is received without modification, or duplication.
• Data Confidentiality: data must be sent in an encrypted manner so that no one other than the sender or recipient can read it.
• Availability: this service is used to prevent the loss of access e.g. due to denial of service attacks.
Comparison of Security Protocols
Quite recently some sensor network security solutions have been proposed [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] but each suffer from various limitations as discussed below.
Adrain Perrig et. al [8] have proposed security protocols suite called SPINS for wireless sensor networks. SPINS consist of two building blocks SNEP and uTESLA. SNEP provides data confidentiality, two party data authentication and data freshness where as uTESLA provides authenticated broadcast for severally resource constraint environment. For data confidentiality they use symmetric encryption mechanism in which secret key called master key is shared between sensor node and base station. SNEP uses one time encryption key that produces from the unique master key. SNEP uses MAC function for two party authentications and checking data integrity. SPINS is based on binary security model means either it provides maximum security or no security. There are number of drawbacks associated with SPINS such as
• It can only work in non-anonymous environment in which all nodes have some unique id.
• Because of the usage of source routing scheme in SPINS they are making the network vulnerable to traffic analysis [13] .
• It does not address security in the Physical layer therefore they are unable to provide defense mechanism against physical layer attacks such as jamming etc. K. Jones et. al [10] have proposed a solution for providing differential security services for wireless sensor network by using parameterized frequency hopping and cryptographic keys mechanism. Their solution provides integrity, confidentiality and availability for the sensor networks that consist of anonymous nodes. In order to ensure the availability they use frequency hopping scheme that is conventionally used for "implementing frequency diversity and interference averaging in a non-hostile environment". Due to the node anonymity there solutions does not provide access control and nonrepudiation. They do not provide direct authentication mechanism but on the other hand it is very difficult for the external node who attempt to masquerade as a legitimate node. The main reason for this is that it is very difficult for intruder to guess which set of frequencies and hopping sequence is currently used [14] .
Chris Karlof et. al [9] have proposed TinySec architecture for wireless sensor networks. TinySec is a link layer security protocol that provides authentication, integrity and confidentiality by adding less than 10% of energy, latency and bandwidth overhead. TinySec does not provide access control and non-repudiation. It also does not provide protection against physical layer attacks. The major drawback of this solution is that it is tightly coupled with Berkeley TinyOS and can not be use for general sensor network model [7] . Like SPINs it can only work in non-anonymous environment in which all nodes have some unique id.
Taejoon park and Kang G. Shin [11] have proposed Light weight Security protocol (LiSP) that's makes a tradeoff between security and energy consumption through efficient re-keying mechanism. LiSP achieves authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, access control and availability. Another important feature of LiSP architecture is the ability to detection intrusions. By using LiSP each node need to save eight keys.
Sencun Zhu et. al [12] have proposed Localized Encryption and Authentication protocol (LEAP) for large scale distributed wireless sensor networks. The unique feature about LEAP is that, it they provides four key mechanisms in order to meet different security requirements and their keys mechanism is scalable. The major draw back of that LEAP is that it only works in static environment in which nodes are not mobile, and also author assumes that the Base station will not be compromised.
General Comparison of all above discussed schemes from security parameters perspective is given in table 2. 
Tetra Security Framework for Wireless Sensor Networks
Our Tetra security framework consist of four main components Here term 'light weight' means procedure take less computation power and consume less energy. All fours components jointly work together to achieve higher security in an efficient manner. They are used to defend most of the passive and active attacks. This Tetra security frame work will be installed in a sink node or base station. In ubiquitous sensor nets, the role of traditional base station is changed to router [15] . Tetra will established secure tunnels with user in order to provide services in a secure manner. The scenario is illustrated in fig 1. 
Light weight Key Management Scheme (LKMS)
Generally we talk about how to ensure confidentiality, authentication, and availability etc, but all these services are dependent upon key management. If our key management scheme is not secure them we can not provide secure communication medium. Traditional public key certificate based key management schemes are unsuitable for wireless sensor networks because they are not communication efficient. There are two types of keys management schemes; interactive schemes and non-interactive schemes [16] .
1. Interactive schemes such as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) reduce communication and computations cost but it requires higher interactive exchanges. 2. Non-iterative schemes that use identity based cryptography are still immature and require considerable computations whereas random key pre-distribution technique reduces computations at the cost of interactions.
Our goal is to build LKMS that combines the benefits of both, identity based and random based predistribution technique called identity based random key pre-distribution scheme (IBRKP). LKMS, by using IBRKP technique established pair wise keys with virtually no extra communications.
Light weight Secure Routing Protocol (LSRP)
Routing in wireless sensor networks has been reasonably studied by different researcher specially with respect to energy efficient routing. Number of different network routing protocols for wireless sensor networks have been developed such as TinyOS beaconing protocol [17] , Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) protocol [18] , Geographical and energy aware routing protocol (GEAR) [19] , Lowenergy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) protocol [20] , Threshold sensitive Energy Efficient sensor Network protocol (TEEN) [21] , and some other energy conserving topology maintenance protocols such as SPAN [22] , and GAF [23] .
All these protocols have not been designed keeping security in mind therefore they are vulnerable to many types of attacks such as bogus routing information, elective forwarding, Sybil, hello floods, worm holes etc. Table 3 shows the summary of attacks against proposed sensor network routing protocols [24] . From this table it is clear that most of the routing protocols are insecure.
Sensor Network Sensor Network
User IP Secure Tunnels The objective of LSRP is to build secure routing protocol that shows resistance to all types of active and passive attackes. LSRP will be build by following the guidelines that have been suggested by Charis Karlof and David Wagner in [24] for designing secure routing protocols.
Light weight Intrusion Detection System (LIDS)
Detection of intrusion in wireless sensor network is very difficult because of limited resources. We need solution that is fully distributed that takes less computation power and introduces minimum communication overhead. That is the objective of LIDS system. We need LIDS systems in order to detect compromised node and to protect node against sending false data.
Light weight Trust Management System (LTMS)
With the emergence of ubiquitous computing the need of trust management is also increased. Current research on sensor networks is mostly built on a trusted environment [25] . Before implementing any security mechanism we need to ensure that all nodes are trusted. Trust can solve the problems that can not be solved by traditional cryptography security [26] for example, judging the quality of sensor nodes and the quality of their services, and providing the corresponding access control. Traditional Trust mechanisms [27, 28, 29] are not suitable for wireless sensor networks because of higher consumption of resources such as memory and power. Therefore we need Light weight Trust management System (LTMS) for large scale distributed wireless sensor networks.
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the current security solutions for wireless sensor networks and find outs their major pros and cons. Initially we have given the comparison of various security protocols from the perspective of basic security services such as authentication, access control, non-repudiation, integrity, confidentiality and availability. We found that none of the solutions provides complete security and most of them are vulnerable to many types of security threats. Therefore we have proposed new hypothetical Tetra security framework for distributed wireless sensor networks. In future we will design the detail architecture of each component and will test this framework on real test bed for in-depth performance analysis.
